Sato Check · MCP server
skim-mcp
mcp:npm:skim-mcp · v0.2.5 · sha256:767f5f3b00a7 · as of 2026-09-26
- Does it take your key? traced
- Yes — it reads private-key material. Local signing is what a wallet does; question 2 says whether the key leaves.
- Our static read of the published artifact found it.
- Does your key leave? observed
- Not observed — no planted key left during install and start-up, under our test conditions — code paths that only run later, or only on a trigger, are not covered.
- We ran it with planted test keys and saw it.
- Can it move funds on its own? no evidence
- No action that signs or sends funds found.
- No evidence line on file for this question yet.
- What changed? no evidence
- First profile of this subject — nothing to compare yet.
- No evidence line on file for this question yet.
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Hosts contacted
| Host | When | Role | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| skim402.com | code | vendor | traced |
| registry.npmjs.org | install | registry | observed |
| nodejs.org | install | other | observed |
Evidence (8 lines)
- observedO-hosts2026-09-25
registry.npmjs.org was contacted during install (registry).
sandbox:obs_adc34e4594e97e43
- observedO-hosts2026-09-25
nodejs.org was contacted during install (other).
sandbox:obs_adc34e4594e97e43
- tracedT-install-script2026-09-26
package.json runs postinstall: npm install -g tsx@4.21.0.
package.json
- tracedT-key-read2026-09-26
Reads process.env.SKIM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY.
dist/index.js:10
- tracedT-key-read2026-09-26
Reads privateKeyToAccount() on a value read from key material (normalized).
dist/index.js:37
- tracedT-hosts2026-09-26
skim402.com appears in shipped code (vendor).
dist/index.js
- tracedT-key-named2026-09-26
The shipped code names SKIM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY in a message to the user.
dist/index.js
- declaredD-env-key2026-09-26
Setup names SKIM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY as something to provide.
deploy_spec.requires
Limits
- Traced analysis follows flows inside one module only; a key handed from one module to another is not followed.
- Key egress not observed during install and start-up, under our test conditions — code paths that only run later, or only on a trigger, are not covered.
- Sandbox: DNS queries made directly by the target are not logged; hosts are recorded from proxied HTTP(S) requests and CONNECTs..
- Sandbox: Code that ignores HTTP(S)_PROXY has no route out of the sandbox, so its attempts are not captured..
A profile describes what we read and ran, with dates. It is not a safety rating, an audit or an endorsement, and "not found" is not "not there".
sato.custody/v1 · custody-1
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